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THE PRIVACY OF RELIGION IN THE SELF-MANAGING 
SOCIETY 
by Spiro Marasovic 
Spiro Marasovic (Roman Catholic) is a priest and theologian from Croatia, 
Yugoslavia. This article was originally published in Crkva u Svijetu (Split), Yugoslavia, 
and was translated wilh the permission of Lhe publisher and Lhe author. 
"Freedom which is only for supporters of Lhc government, only for members of one 
party-no mauer how numerous they arc-is not freedom. Freedom is only freedom for 
the one who thinks differently. This is not because of some fanatical "righteousness" bur . 
in its very essence, all that is instructive, good and purifying in political freedom and its 
essential effect, is nullified if freedom becomes a privilege." R. Luxemburg.! 
On June 25, 1986, was the Twentieth anniversary of the signing of an agreement between the 
Holy See and the government of the Socialist Federal Republie of Yugoslavia. Mter a relatively 
long period of post war struggles, this document was supposed to represent a positive initiative in 
relationships, not only between the Holy See and Yugoslavia on the state level, but also of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia on the level of society. Now we have the opportunity to 
ask ourselves whether and how far this agreement fulfilled its purpose. 
First we must immediately say, clearly, that it is more than obvious that this agreement has 
been for us a great step forward in Church life and its fruits are obvious to anyone who has eyes to 
see. For example, following the agreement, bishops no longer have any problems communicating 
�ith the Vatican, which at least until the Council was difficult and full of problems. The same is 
true of opportunities for priests and monks to travel abroad to study or work. Following the 
agreement also, theology students in the armed services are no longer singled out for special 
treatment, as was previously the case, and other similar instances. It seems, llowever, that such 
changes have been best realized on the level of Church and state institutions while points of 
disagreement on the level of the individual believer in society which were also obvious before, 
remain unsolved even after the agreement. the following facts demonstrate this: 
a/ Despite all constitutional and legal rulings as to the equal rights and political equality of all 
peoples and citizens, regardless of their ideology or religion, which (among other things) are 
founded on the oft mentioned and publicly admitted fact that, along with many other members of 
this society and citizens, believers took part in the People's War of Liberation (World War II) and 
in the Socialist Revolution, even 40 years after the war these same believers do not have any real 
opportunities to attain any kind of significant social or government functions or positions. Nor are 
there any believers in any of the forums where socially significant decisions are made. There are 
none even in the slightly higher forums of the Union of Socialist Working People of 
Yugoslavia,2 where they have huge numbers of members nor in the Union of Socialist Youth 
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where they also have a large membership. The security services and armed forces (meaning the 
officer ranks) need not even e mentioned. Even some alibi exceptions which could be found here 
and there, cannot detract from this fact. Since this situation has remained the same for 40 years and 
even though it has no constitutional or legal foundation, and its is equally widespread throughout 
Yugoslavia-we may well ask ourselves: why is this the case? 
b/ Since such a chronic and constant discrepancy exists between what has been stated and how 
that statement is put into practice, it would be reasonable to expect that at least the mass media 
(for whom the USWPY is publisher) would deal with it more often and in a serious manner, and 
would expose it and distance themselves from it. But no; instead of that in those same media we 
find a constant campaign against believers and the Church. Even though they are de facto shut out 
from political and social involvement, believers are constantly being accused of supposed 
transgressions of constitutional and legal rights, of clericalism and similar things. If this 
accusation came only from party agents, that could still be understandable to a certain extent, as 
communists by definition are atheists and as such they accept atheism as part of their program. But 
how is it that where religion and the Church are concerned, there is no difference between party 
members who are by definition atheists, and members of the USWPY which should not consist 
entirely of atheists. One again we ask ourselves, how can this be? 
c/ On the basis of the constitutional ruling concerning the separation of Church and State, 
clerics in Yugoslavia are banned by law from any kind of political involvement However, there 
are several cases of priests and some bishops who have received state awards. Since the work of the 
Church and believers is evangelism, pastoral care, catechism, theology, spirituality, charity and the 
like, and as we know that the state docs not give out awards for such activities, the question arises: 
what other reasons were there for these to be awarded? If we set aside several cases where it is a 
case of obvious cultural or scientific achievements, it is clear in the case of these bishops, that 
these things were not the reasons. This is why we wonder: did they not receive rewards for political 
services-i.e. for services carried out precisely in the field where they should not be involved by 
law? 
So, here we have outlined the problem in general and also focussed our attention on the 
constitutional ruling which states that in Yugoslavia religion is the "private affair" of every 
individual, suggesting that the answer to these questions may lie in the multitude of interpretations 
and inadequate application of this ruling.3 
I. THE THEOLOGICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. 
Christian-Marxist dialogues in Yugoslavia more closely resemble bilateral monologues than 
that which we normally understand when we usc the term dialogue: Like the fox and the stork in 
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the well known fable, who entertained one another but always in such a way that the guest could 
not even taste the food offered {the fox is unable to cat from a narrow jar because he does not have 
a beak like the stork and the stork is unable to like the offered porridge because his beak gets in the 
way) so in our dialogues we have not come much further as regards methodology. In these 
monologues in fact all that happens is a public recitation of what we already know and a public 
suppression of also well-known facts. Both what is publicized and what is suppressed are well­
known to both sides, but we still remain· quiet about it, or rather we simply pay no heed to it The 
suppressed side of the monologues is actually mutual suspicion and distrust. There is no 
conviction as to the sincerity of the other party-or any co��iction that there is no ulterior motive 
·hidden behind what is said. 
As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, its thoughts, its goals, its aspirations really hold 
no secrets and no hidden motives. All its teachings and desires are contained in documents of the 
government, and whoever proclaims freedom of religion (including Roman Catholicism) on his 
territory must also realize that freedom presupposes and includes the freedom of believers to accept 
and to identify with the Church's creed and with its aspirations. These are all included in these 
documents. 
They state that the Church, even if it wanted to , cannot deny its internal and external form. 
The Catholic faith has its own anthropology, its own scale of values, its own way of looking at 
life and things which to a greater or lesser extent differentiate it from other groups or movements, 
be they secular or religious. A non-Catholic naturally, cannot accept these Catholic viewpoints and 
attitudes, but if someone approaches these issues from a government position, then he/she must of 
necessity know and respect them. For, the freedom of religion ensured by oUr constitution must 
mean the freedom of the creed which the believer actually believes and not the freedom of some · 
religion which a non-believer imputes to a believer and then interpret what he/she has imputed. 
For this reason it is vital to understand how we believers see, understand and experience the 
constitutional statement that our faith is the private mauer of every individual, and the more so 
because the issues surrounding this are extremely vague and confused. Our approach to this 
problem is subject to certain principles which are not exclusively Catholic or Christian; and as 
such could be described as general. We will briefly outline them below. 
I. The Right to Integrate Thought and Action. 
Freedom, defined as the known possibility of a new way of life, is not born and does not have 
its origin primarily outside or inside of a human being. No slave is free of his/her chains (unless 
he has never felt his/her chains to be degrading) until he/she turns his/her back on them and breaks 
them inside himself/herself. Only as the tlood of the realization of freedom overwhelms his/her 
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inner being, do the external chains and defences also fall. However the one who has come to accept 
his/her chains as though it were a normal condition, who identifies himself/herself with them, will 
never be able to throw off even the chains that hold him/her externally, because freedom must be 
total (integrated). External freedom is always preceded by internal freedom, and at the same time 
assumes it. Internal freedom alone, without the external is torment, and external freedom alone 
without the internal, is a tragedy. 
What is true of freedom is also true of the relationship between the human inner life and the 
external world in general. As thought always precedes action, so action makes a thought reality. A 
life worthy of a person is therefore only that life where to a substantial extent thought and action 
are integrated. All else is torment or lies. Therefore to force someone to say or do something 
which he/she does not believe, is to force him/her to live a lie, a life not worthy of a human 
being. We are not talking here about so-c.alled "freedom of thought and conscience," but about 
freedom to express one's thoughts and freedom to live according to one's own conscience. A 
human's thoughts have always been directed at freedom and thinking people have always through 
what they like and how they like. This is not the gift of any regime or of any revolution. But the 
freedom to express one's thoughts and the freedom to live according to one's own conscience � 
depend on external social factors. The level of humanity of the particular regime of society depends 
on the extent to which it allows its subjects to live an in�gratcd life (i.e. where they can freely 
express their thoughts and freely live according to their beliefs). A person who within his/her own 
society is unable to act according to his/her internal convictions, but rather according to some 
sociological principles, would be a social and political schizophrenic, living two lives, one his/her 
own, the internal, and the other an alien one, the public life. A society which accepts for itself 
thoughts in public which arc opposed to the opinions of the majority of its members would in this 
way force its citizens to live as hypocrites. At the very least it would be a hypocritical society. Of 
course we understand that the fundamental human right that a person can live and act in accordance 
with his/her convictions is not absolute, but is limited by the same right of others, wheth.er the 
person acts as an individual or as a group. 
2. The Precedence of Conscience over Truth. 
This awareness is in fact fairly recent even in the Catholic Church so that the late Pope John 
Paul I once publicly admitted how in its time the Council's declaration on freedom of religion 
"Dignitatis humanae," produced a theological crisis in him. Even today Archbishop l'vl. Lefebvre 
and his not so unknown followers and sympathizers bear witness to the fact that he is not the only 
one. For the principle by which they had been brought up, which is quite correct in itself, that 
truth and error cannot have the same right to co-exist, had at times and in some places been 
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interpreted and practised in such a way that there was no room for legitimate pluralism and for the 
integrity of one's own conscience. Therefore there was at times a pressure exerted in the name of 
truth on a person's conscience to an almost incomprehensible extent. 
The Second Vatican Council sought once and for all to put an end to all this. In so doing, the 
Roman Catholic Church did not deny its deep awareness that it is the only true Apostolic Church 
in which there is the fulness of revelation, and upon that Revelation the truth is founded which it 
is responsible to bring to the whole world.4 It did not deny its lasting doctrine that each one is 
responsible to seek the truth and to order his/her life according to that truth. This still stands as 
before. But in spite of all this, that is in spite of this awareness, the Church publicly teaches that 
truth, even if it  is its own, may not be forced on anyone, nor even hinder anyone to live according 
to his/her own conscience which may not be in accord with our "truth." For the right to live 
according to the truth of one's own conscience does not arise from the truth itself, but from the 
nature of each human being. 
"This Vatican Council", it says in the document."Dignitatis humanae," "proclaims that every 
human being has the right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all peoples must be free 
from pressure from individuals or social groups or any kind of human authorities, and that in 
matters of faith no one should be compelled to do anything against his own conscience, whether in 
public or in private, alone or together with others, within the limits of duty. It also proclaims that 
the right to religious freedom is founded in the very dignity of every human being, as we learn 
from God's revealed Word and from our own reason ... 5 
Having thus interpreted the right to freedom of conscience as part of the dignity of every 
human being and not on any supernatural grounds, the Roman Catholic Church by logic admitted 
that same right for all who are included in the term "humans." Of course that means everyone-the 
Church did not preserve the right for itself alone. But it does seek it for itself! This is not because 
it alone is the oniy true way, but because this freedom is part of the dignity of every human being 
and whoever ignores this, sins against human dignity. Therefore the Church is not seeking 
anything that it docs not allow to others, so that every speech about how the Church is seeking 
some kind of monopoly or privilege, if it is not pure deception, is a sign of ignorance of the 
subject in question. 
3. The Legitimacy of Democratic Authority Comes from the People. 
The Catholic Church, since it is "catholic," which means universal, lives and works in 
many societies which differ from one another and in social systems which may but do not 
necessarily conform to Christian principles in their public life. Thus the question arises: what kind 
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of relationship should there be between .the believer's right to integrity of thought and action and 
the logic on which the particular society is based, meaning a way of thought which is obligatory 
for everyone. Is it a necessary principle of the Roman Catholic Church that its conscience and 
principles should become public-i. -e. political consciousness and the conscience of every 
individual in society? 
No, in no way do the principles of the Roman Catholic Church demand this. A society if 
the majority are Catholics, may accept Catholic thinking even in the public arena (after all it must 
have some kind of philosophy!) but as most contemporary societies are pluralistic and as the 
Church seeks freedom for itself arid for other religions and world views, it is understandable that it 
cannot seek to be the only and exclusive way. What the Church is seeking is that the public (i. e. 
socio-political thought and logic) should not oppose what it is trying to do and what members of 
that society want, at least-if it would not work any other way-what the majority wants. It is 
not the same thing to accept somcone's ideas (which all public authorities must do) and to adopt 
them (which authorities do not have to do). No sLate needs to adopt Catholic thought iii its 
polirtical l ife, but if that state is in fact a democratic system, by the force of the logic of 
democratic life, it  will have to respect that way of thinking, in the sense that it should not be 
allowed to make any decision opposed to that thinking and that it will not demand that believers 
perform any tasks which are in conflict with their faith. This in fact arises out of the very term 
"democracy" -the power of the people. It is unthinkable that a nation, or rather the majority of a 
nation, should rule itself like a schizophrenic, in a manner completely opposed to what it really 
thinks and desires. Believers constitute the Church, but they also are part of the demos which is in 
power. Even if believers arc in the minority in some society, or rather when in some area adherents 
of any faith or world view form a definite minority, even then it is necessary for the public 
authorities, as far as possible, to take into consideration the consciousness of that segment of the 
nation. It cannot be any other way if politicians in a tkmocrac.:y arc only delegates of the people 
and not holding power endowed by some mysterious higher authority. Otherwise believers (or 
members of minority faiths) in that kind of society would be mere second class citizens, a 
common work force, and no more. 
The "privacy of religion" therefore, according to these principles, can only mean that a 
certain belief is not official or normative in public matters, that it has no privileges and that its 
tenets are not in any way binding to any other member of the same political group. But it cannot 
mean that privacy is actually a synonym for "non-existencc"-that is that the authorities can 
behave towards believers as though they are not believers, that jt is able to ignore the existence of 
religion and the Church. Moreover it has no right in the name of some other tenet, to oppose that 
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religion and Church, or rather go against religious groups which exist on its territory. No political 
power has anyone from whom to receive a mandate for something of that nature. "The privacy of 
religion" means that the people for justifiable reasons have taken their religious life and religious 
issues out of the jurisdiction of the civil authorities so that each one is permitted to and able to 
believe whatever he or she likes and to practice the religion he or she chooses without any kind of 
repercussions in public, socio-political life. B ut the "privacy of religion" does not mean being 
wriuen off publicly, the disqualification of one or more religions for the advancement of some 
new, public and all-encompassing negation of all of them both collectively and individually. 
II. SELF-MANAGEMENT-POLITICS OR SECULARIZATION? 
What at first sight characterizes self-managing socialism as a unique socio-political 
system amongst all known systems, and what is important here, is that this system seeks to be ·  
socialism with the greatest degree of democracy, democracy with the greatest degree of socialism, 
secularization with no kind of belief, and belief that Marxism is the same as secularization. This 
combination of democracy and socialism, belief and secularization, all within the bounds of the 
dictates of the proletariat, cannot fail to have consequences for the life of faith and the Church. For 
it is significant that according to Marxist philosophy, the period of government by the proletariat 
is relatively short but intensive, a time of subjective alignment of social forces towards a 
communist society, in which, as is well-known, there will no longer be any religion or church. 
Therefore in this context, let us look at what the phrase 'religion is the private matter of the 
individual" could mean in socialist jargon. First of all we must sec how far a secularized society of 
a socialist type allows religion and secondly how far the socio-political dictates of the proletariat 
allow the privacy of thought and conviction. 
1. The Subjective and the Objective in the Politics of Socialism. 
Yugoslav socialism has the basic genetic characteristics of Leninism, that is, that version 
of Marxism which became so fatally confused at the time of the Third International. .The chief 
characteristic of Lenin's Marxism, or as it is usually called "Marxist-Leninism" to differentiate it 
from original Marxism, is according to Lenin, because of a lack of the most basic conditions for a 
socialist revolution in Russia (the working class, for example, hardly existed), a lack of objective 
causes had to be made up by a surplus of subjective causes. Marx himself had ascribed to this 
subjective factor an almost messianic role and importance by declaring it to be the sole possessor 
of a special, uniquely correct class awareness. But even that subjective factor is still not able to 
achieve what it seeks. Rather, in practice it functions as mature socio-economic objective 
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conditions and circumstances. The communist parLy, as an organized objective factor, according to 
Marx, alone correctly interprets historical events and therefore its function is to further direct those 
events. But, according to Marx, the party does not create objective circumstances! They are the 
fruit of historical laws which cannot be altered or imposed. 
Lenin and Leninism means one step further in the development of the self-awareness of 
that subjective factor in society. Since Lenin and the Russian revolutionaries had no time nor will 
to wait until objective circumstances came around and matured, they added revolutionary 
voluntariam to the already existing messianic consciousness of the subjective factor. Thus, from a 
party which interprets and directs legitimate social development, came a party, which, according to 
its own will, imposes laws onto that development. In no way was Lenin an exception in this 
regard amongst the Russian revolutionaries. This brand of voluntarism was also characteristic of 
the Russian Nationalists and Anarchists as well as of the Bolsheviks. As the Bolsheviks did not 
have the people's mandate-being a party exclusively of one class, and that not even the class 
which made up the majority of the people, (for at that time that class was not qualitively 
sufficiently developed)-for this reason it was not necessary for them to be accountable to the 
people, but only to history. 
This kind of messianic-voluntaristic self-consciousness, a typically Russian variety of 
Marxism, spread later to all members of the Third International, so that in the way they interpreted 
it, "democracy" was understood and practised as power for the people and not the power of the 
people. Since the people were divided into classes, they could not· govern for every government is 
from one particular class, and as the working classes, who should have taken power, had not yet 
attained the status of a "class in its own right," they were not able to govern. Power then fell 
exclusively to the Party, as one segment in society which was a class in its own right and to 
whom history had given the manda:te to rule the people in the name of the working classes. 
Armed with this kind of consciousness of its own messianic mission, the consciousness 
that they could change the world in any way they felt fit, the Bolsheviks did not think it necessary 
to wait patiently for the matuation of social conditions in which religion would die out, as Marx 
had predicted it would. Rather they, as the subjective factor in history, decided to hasten that death 
even if social conditions were not ready for it. As they could not speed up history, they hastened 
the predicted historical outcome, as if they wanted to sec the communist eschaton in their lifetime. 
"The privacy of religion," in a campaign conceived and executed in that way, could only have one 
meaning given by this subjective factor, and that is the most restrictive sense. For at that time 
there was no question s to the separation of State and Church. The only question was: How? 
Everything that was done was tactical, aimed at a strategic goal. So any discussion which took 
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. place about this was merely a question of methods-should they approach the Church harshly and 
by force, or should they apply some kind of euthanistic skill. Lenin was against proclaiming 
religion as a private mauer.6 He was only in favor of religious groups being declared "private 
societies" in the strictly restricted sense, that is not. in the sense of a democratic admission of thelt 
autonomy, but in the sense that they as such lost all support from public funds and all influence in 
schools.? However, due to its abstract self-awareness and sectarian relationship with the real world, 
the bolshevik socialists, regardless of the fact that they had declared religion a private matter, did 
. . 
not solve the problem of the Church in their jurisdiction, rather they only made it )Tiore complex. 
Srdjan Vrcan speaks of the "clccply contradictory_ and even slightly paradoxical nature" of ,. 
the real position which religion had reached in those societies "when they had gone beyond the 
bounds of classical Stalinism. "  
On the one hand religion a s  a peculiar cultural im d  symbolic system o f  socially alien 
nature and as the basic of preoccupations and activities ·which arc also alien to the system, 
has been treated by the system more or less like a "foreign body" among the members of 
the socialist society. Therefore naturally it is squeezed exclusively into the purely private 
sphere and excluded from all public involvement. Moreover the system undertakes to 
prevent any possibility that religion could become socially or politically significant. 
Thus, depending on circumstances, they subject it to severe or mild, partial or complete 
institutional limitations, suppression and pressure. At the same time, religion has emerged 
as the only cultural and symbolic system of an alien nature which has been legally 
accepted as an institution and is given a certain area of activity and organization which the 
social system controls only externally. That is, on the one hand religion is treated by the 
system as the private matter of the individual, while institutionally they try to strip it of 
all social relevancy and push it not only out of the political arena, but also out of the 
entire public realm, transforming it into something without public significance. On the 
other hand, the cultural exclusivism inherent in the system tends towards a continual 
politicization of religion. In a certain way the very "alien-ness" of religion in a political 
and cultural sense almost of necessity leads to the politicization of religion.S 
Entirely in accord with this kind of assessment of the state of religion · in socialist 
societies, we believe that no great importance should be attached to the fact that the first 
constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, drawn up in 1946, does not mention 
religion as the private affair of every individual, whilst the subsequent constitutions of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia do, including the constitution which is in force today, 
Whether the first post-war constitution had omitted it because of the stronger influence of Lenin's 
opinions in that so-called first phase of "revolutionary statism " or for some other reason, we do 
not know. It is not necessari ly significant under whose politi.cal influence Yugoslavia was in 
regard to the approach to this problem of mentioning or nm mentioning religion as a private 
matter. B ut as Yugoslavia passed from the phase of revolutionary statism to the development of 
self-management, the fact that this is expressly mentioned must be significant, for self­
management endeavors to affirm once :.�gain the demos and democracy, which were neglected by the 
Bolsheviks. Once things have turned towards the demos and have opened the doors to democracy, i. 
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e. the stronger affmnation of objective realities, religion as the private affair of the individual can 
no longer be the exclusive object of interpretation and politics of the so-called subjective factors­
rather of the citizens whose private affair it is. 
"It is a funda�ental truth of self-management strategy," says Vrcan, "that at least on the 
theoretical level it rejects the possibility of building socialism under the decisive and 
comprehensive influence of the state, and furthermore by means of a distinct minority in power, 
which constantly reproduces itself as a minority and which as a result can only exercise its power 
in accord with a rigid one-party political system."9 This kind of strategy presupposes a pluralism 
of interests, including cultural pluralism, in which the culture of so-called subjective factors may 
only be one of many, but not the only one which is valued. In the Lcninist-S talinist sense 
"private" was a restricted concept which created, interpreted, and brought into being subjective 
factors in accord with their own political persuasion, for their own purposes, at the same time not 
consulting interested parties. But under self-management, which once again affirms the democratic, 
this is no longer possible. In a democracy the field of the private can and must be understood in an 
affirmative sense; and the right to interpret it belongs to the people whose affair it in fact is. 
However, the issue is far from being clarified, as we might have e.x:pccted it would be. That is, it 
remains unclear in the area of religion, which and what kind of powers the subjective factor may 
retain for itself, as an area where it may carry out its own plans, in accord with its political ideals, 
but without in so doing, crossing the boundaries of democracy and democratic freedom. Since this 
problem remains unsolved in our country up to the present �e may see the theoretical background 
to the contemporary attacks on the Church and believers, or rather the theoretical background to 
their actual position in socio-political life. 
2. The Subjective and the Objective in the Process of Secularization 
Secularization as a socio-cul tural process is not a recent phenomenon but its 
interpretation, its extent, and its final goal even today arc still not fully understood or generally 
accepted. On the one hand, as we sec the positive side, secularization signifies in fact a justifiable 
Iaicization, that is just emancipation of all lay or worldly life from the direct influence of the 
clergy, which by strength of belief, dogma, and logic, in fact, do not fal l  under their direct control 
or leadership. The fact that these aspects of life were once controlled by the clergy-and to a greater 
or lesser extent in some places still arc today-was not because they were especially empowered 
for these tasks by God, but' solely because they were the only ones at that time and in that place, 
or one of the rare social groups who were able to fulfil that social role by strength of their above 
average education and organization, \Vhich made them competent to perform various duties. Of 
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course, it goes without saying, that at a time of general illiteracy, no society could ignore the 
services of practically the only educated work force, based on a shared faith. It is also 
understandable that, lulled by centuries of tradition and practice, many members of the clergy, had 
not developed and refined in themselves a feeling for the boundaries between their duties as priests 
and those which arose out of their higher level of education and their social status which was 
founqe� !Jpon it. Even the feeling for the time when they should give up these secular offices to 
lay 'Yorkers was not always sensed in all places. So it happens that what was at one time nonnal 
and went without saying, became, in the new age, abnonnal and incomprehensible. Tis is how 
what we call "clericalism" arose. This is when in totally new circumstances the clergy tried to 
retain for itself authority in areas of life which were no longer their responsibility. 
The Second Vatican Council distanced itself clearly from this kind of clericalism. It 
underlined as a sign of social maturity the rightness and legitimacy of the emancipation of secular 
life from the direct involvement of the clergy in every matter for which they were not fitted 
because of their call to the Church. This teaching runs through all the Council's documents 
· . especially the pastoral c.onstitution "Gaudium et spes", in which it clearly set out as part of the 
"autonomy of temporal things" lO Therefore the Church has declared from the highest authority, 
loud and clear, that it does not consider itself obliged as a Church, under its mandate given by God, 
to be involved in any one particular brand of politics as typically its own, any one .culture as 
typically its own, any form of science as typically its own, and so on. Every believer is free to 
experiment in these areas and to act in ways appropriate to these areas of human interest. The 
Church, as the Church will only become involved in these things when they touch on issues of 
faith or morality. · 
There is however another much more broadly spread view of secularization, which sees it 
not only as a process of the right emancipation of the secular life, but inore simply the distancing 
of people from the Church and r�ligion in genera. This kind of secularization is in fact the Church 
and religion in general. This kind os secularization is in fact a synonym for atheism. Such 
interpretation of secularization we believers do not sec as positive and we do not consider efforts 
made to spread it to be positive. Regardless of how we think and feel, this kind of secularization 
even in the Western world is not a new phenomenon. Throughout its history, this kind of 
secularization has ebbed and flowed. Today, according to contemporary research arid observations, it 
is once again at a stand still, and, according to some, even retreat. 
Secularization and democracy, at least in the forms they have emerged and developed in 
Europe, go together. However because of its emphasis on distancing itself from religion and the 
Church, it comes to be taken over by certain clements which, in fact, have no logical right to it. 
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So, for example, Marxist-Leninism is anti-religion and <\nli-church, but that does not mean that 
societies built on it are necessarily at the same time secular societies. Secularization is a process 
whose results include aversion towards any kind of mediator between anyone or anything. In its 
extreme state, secularization does not only mean the turning of the world into itself, but also the 
turning of each individual into himself/herself. This is the attempt to interpret the world by itself 
alone and at the same time to motivate each human being by himsdf/herself alone. Th is is why 
secularization is distanced from religion and the Church 31ot primarily because secularized people 
see themselves as more intelligent than those attached to some religion or the Church, but because 
they see the church as a mediator and its belief and morals as the: mediated belief and mediated 
morals. They cannot square these with their ideal of autonomy. For them this is heteronomy. 
Marxism, however, offers exaclly the thing secularization rejects-a mediator. What sets 
Marxists apart from all other politically active people is their self-awareness that their 
consciousness is, in fact, scientifically a universal consciousness, which they axe responsible to 
mediate first of all to the working classes and then to all people, until it becomes the truly 
universal human consciousness. On this is based their right to be the only subjective factor. As 
Leninism is Marxism tailored to fit everyday politics, the previous function of the clergy in a 
clericized society now passes to members of that subjective factor. They approach religion and the 
Church from a secularized position rather than from the position of a positive alternative to the 
Church. This is why, in contrast to a secularized society where interested citizens, religious 
workers, and communities but not politicians, are involved in religion as the private affair of every 
citizen, in a Marxist-Leninist society politicians arc concerned with religion, but believing cit!zens 
are not involved in politics although they should have every right to be so involved. In a 
nonsecularized society, even if religion has been declared the private affair of every individual, in 
fact, it never is. And if it is not, society is divided exactly at the limits set for religion. 
Sociological research bears witness to the fact that this is the case in Yugoslavia. 
Although S. Vrcan used the term "secularized" even for socialist societies, especially for self­
management, to mean the distancing of people form religion and the Church, he still had to admit 
that this was a secularization which was developing II under the considerable infl!Jcnce of politics," 
and which in a deepening social crisis d isplayed its "totally specious and superficial nature." 
'The false and flimsy nature of that kind of secularization shows itself in almost all 
situations where the gap or split between so-called legal society and the so-called real 
society shows itself and widens. That is, that gap usually appears as a gap between the so-· 
called legal society, which sees iL�elf as almost entirely secularized and in which religion 
exists as a definitely minority phenomenon and a more or less "folk lore" clement of 
social life, which it is barely worth bothering about, :md the so-callc:d rc:al society where 
religion exists as a massive and unavoidable fact of social life with a higb motivation 
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potential, able in certain circumstances to activate and mobilize huge numbers of 
people:•ll 
Or as the same writer says in another place: 
"We should expect of course, that secularization in the sense of a lessening in the 
social importance of religion and its greater privatization, would naturally lead to a gradual 
but continuous fall in the need to discuss the Church and religion first of all in political 
terms, and that various political bodies would need to debate the issues less and less, and 
also the need take specific political action concerning religion and the Church would 
diminish. The very fact that in recent years this is not happening rather the very opposite 
is happening, is a sign that secularization in that particular sense is not going exactly the 
way one might expect. This is at least a small confirmation of.the fact that religion and 
the Church are no longer losing their social significance, regardless how this may please 
or displease anyone and regardless of any kind of proclamation. ul2 
Conclusion 
If a society is divided into the so-called legal, which is completely secularized. and the so­
called real, which is widely religious, and if vertical movement between those two societies is 
difficult or impossible in a political sense, in that society religion is not "a private" matter but 
public, that is political. This is the case today in the self-managing society of Yugoslavia. The 
Church, for its part, offers no kind of support for this kind of politicization for a) it would 
necessarily lead to clericalism, which it has rejected and distanced itself from it at the last general 
council and b) the constitutional position of the Church in this society does not give it any kind of 
opportunity for action. Therefore we consider that the improvement in the promised relationship 
between the Church and the State, initiated by the singing of the Protocol twenty years ago and 
which is already fairly well developed on an institutional level, should be continued also in the area 
where the problems have not yet been solved. 
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